The West African nation of Mali has become a key battleground where international mining interests confront evolving resource nationalism policies. The Loulo-Gounkoto complex, operated by Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold, remains one of Africa’s most strategic gold production hubs, generating major economic value for both shareholders and the Malian state. However, 2025 has marked a turning point for Barrick’s Mali gold mine operations, reshaping the balance between corporate control and government intervention.
The Loulo-Gounkoto complex, located in Mali’s mineral-rich southwest, produces around 723,000 ounces of gold annually, positioning it among Africa’s largest and most profitable mining operations. The site combines the underground Loulo mine with the open-pit and underground Gounkoto facility, enabling efficient extraction and operational flexibility. With gold prices surpassing $2,650 per ounce in late 2024, the mine’s estimated annual value reached roughly $1.9 billion — a vital source of foreign exchange for Mali, Africa’s third-largest gold producer.
Barrick holds an 80% stake in the operation through its subsidiary Barrick (Mali) SARL, while the Malian government owns the remaining 20%. This partnership reflects the increasingly common African model that combines foreign investment and technical expertise with local ownership. Beyond mining, the complex incorporates advanced processing, environmental management, and community initiatives.
But in 2025, Mali’s military-led government intensified its push for greater control over natural resources, triggering a series of confrontations with foreign operators. Authorities seized one tonne of refined gold from Barrick’s site and detained four employees on allegations of financial misconduct and terrorism financing. These actions were accompanied by new mining laws demanding higher financial settlements and stricter compliance requirements.
The fallout was severe. From January to October 2025, Barrick’s operations were suspended, causing widespread disruption across the mining ecosystem. Contractors such as Maxam (explosives), Sandvik Group (equipment maintenance), and Etasi & Co. Drilling (geological services) faced delayed payments and halted activities, undermining operational stability. Underground systems — including ventilation, water management, and safety infrastructure — deteriorated, requiring costly recommissioning before any restart.
By mid-2025, the government had appointed provisional managers to oversee the mine, effectively asserting state control. Limited production resumed in October under government supervision, signaling a cautious restart amid ongoing legal and financial disputes.
The Barrick-Mali case underscores the shifting dynamics of Africa’s mining landscape, where governments are asserting stronger claims over national resources and redefining relationships with multinational corporations. As Mali tightens its grip on resource governance, the Loulo-Gounkoto experience offers a revealing glimpse into how political intervention, legal realignment, and economic nationalism are reshaping the future of global mining operations across the continent.
